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TORTS
SECTION II-Husband's Tort Rights Against Wife, Con-
tributory Negligence, Burden of Proof.
Husband's Tort Rights Against His Wife. Presented with
an original proposition in Vigilant Insurance Company v. Bennett,1
the Supreme Court of Appeals enlarged married women's rights
in respect to property. Under this interpretation, the wife may
bring an action against the husband for any tort committed
against her property during coverture.
Interpreting married women's rights under Sections 55-35
and 55-36 Va. Code (1950) which were part of the original Mar-
ried Women's Act,2 the Court states the purpose of the act was
to enlarge the personal rights of married women and to secure
to them separate estates over which they were to have greater
control. The provisions in this section, however, expressly
omitted allowing a married woman from maintaining an action
against the husband for a purely personal tort such as malicious
prosecution, defamation, etc.
In arriving at its decision in this c6se, the Court distinguishes
Keister's Adm'r. v. Keister's Ex'or.8 which was an action for a
personal tort and held that the legislative intent had not been to
bestow on a married woman the substantive civil rights which
would allow her to maintain such an action against her husband.
Since the legislature had failed to state that an action could be
maintained, and the section was in derogation of the common
law which forbade a married woman from maintaining any
action against her husband, the Court construed it strictly and
denied recovery. In this instance, Section 55-35 allows a mar-
ried woman to acquire and dispose of property as if she were
unmarried. It changes her status in regard to property in such
a manner that she now has full control over her separate estate.
The legislature in passing this statute, said the court, fully in-
tended to sever all unity of estate existing between husband and
wife under the common law and to remove all disabilities and
impediments preventing one spouse from maintaining an action
1 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
2 Acts 1876-77, ch. 329, p. 333 as amended by Acts 1877, ch. 265, p. 247.
3 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315, 1 A.L.R. 439 (1918).
against the other for wrongs committed against his respective
properties. Since both are now on an equal status in relation to
property rights, and the wife may maintain an action against the
husband as if he were a stranger, the husband is able to maintain
an action against the wife for wrongs committed against his
property during coverture. In this action, the plaintiff was sub-
rogated to the rights of the husband and was allowed to maintain
the action. This decision by the highest court provides a needed
clarification of the rights of married women.
Contributory Negligence. In the field of contributory
negligence, the Court, in four instances, clarifies the rule of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law and also deals with Sec-
tions 56-414 and 56-416 on comparative negligence. The first
of these cases was Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v.
Hanes Adm'r4 in which a driver of an automobile drove upon a
railroad track with which she was thoroughly familiar, having
used it twice a day for six months, and was hit by a train. There
was conflicting evidence as to the giving of the statutory signals,
and the failure to instruct the jury as to the negligence of the
Railway Company in not giving the statutory signals and the
causal relationship of such failure to the acident was held to be
reversible error. If it could be proven that the Railway had not
given the statutory signals, it would only affect the amount of
recovery but would not completely deny it under the rule stated
in Virginia Railroad Company v. Haley5 where it was held negli-
gence per se to fail to signal in conformance with the statute.
A clearer case of contributory negligence may be shown by
Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company v. Muel-
leo where an employee, Forbes, was held contributorily negligent
as matter of law, and it was imputed to his employer, Mueller,
when he drove onto a blind crossing without taking proper pre-
cautions. Forbes' negative testimony that he heard no warning
from the train was outweighed by the unequivocal testimony of
the train crew that the bell was ringing, and by the fact that
there was no testimony that the driver was listening for a signal.
The court does not state in positive terms what would constitute
4 196 Va. 806, 86 S.E.2d 122 (1955).
5 156 Va. 350, 157 S.E. 776 (1931).
6 197 Va. 533, 90 S.E.2d 135 (1955).
proper precaution. If the driver, Forbes, had dismounted from
the cab, and had walked onto the tracks to a point where he
could see around the obstruction and had seen nothing, returned
to his truck, driven onto the track and was hit by the train,
would he have been contributorily negligent? He was proceed-
ing at the statutory speed of 5 mph and had his truck under con-
trol. He testified that the sight of the train, and the impact was
instantaneous.
In the Campbell7 ease, the Court held that reasonable pre-
cautions consisted of driving slowly, looking and listening for
trains, proceeding in a cautious manner over the tracks. There
the Court did not hold that the driver was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law but left it for the jury to decide. It
appears that there is an inconsistency in these two decisions. Al-
though the facts are slightly different in the Campbell case, it
appears that the standard of care due of the driver in each case
was a proper matter for jury determination.
Where the city ordinances involved are merely permissive in
nature as in Southern Railway Company v. Wilson,8 the Court
held that the comparative negligence rule does not apply, and
contributory negligence as a matter of law barred a recovery
under the rule of Wray v. Norfolk Electric Company9 which
held that when a traveler who approaches a grade crossing and
stops his vehicle in a place of safety, apparently for the purpose
of looking and listening for trains, continues when there is a train
in full view, he is guilty of a reckless disregard for his own
safety. A person is under a duty to maintain a proper lookout and
to abide by what he sees, and if he fails to do so, he is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The Court applied
this principle in Von Roy v. Wbitescarver10 where the plaintiff
undertook to make a left turn when there was an obvious flow
of traffic from the other direction. The Court held that since
looking discloses traffic, the right to proceed is governed by the
test of whether a person of ordinary prudence would attempt
it. The fact that a proper signal was given was only one element
of the proper manner in executing a turn and failure to look
7 Southern Railway Co. v. Campbell, 172 Va. 311, 322, 1 S.E.2d 255 (1939).
8 196 Va. 883, 86 S.E.2d 53 (1955).
9 191 Va. 212, 215, 61 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1950).
10 197 Va. 384, 89 S.E.2d 346 (1955).
ahead after signalling constitutes contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
The question of res judicata brought forth an interesting
opinion in Byrum v. Ames and Webb, Inc.11 The Court applied
the doctrine of Ferebee v. HungarU2 which stated the essentials of
res judicata. Stated simply they are (1) identity of persons and
parties to the issue; (2) identity of issue; (3) mutual estoppel. In
the Ames case the fact that there had been a previous suit in
which both parties had been defendants was held not to be res
judicata, as the parties in the present suit had not been adverse
parties thereto; therefore, element one was missing. Element
three was also missing, for if Ames and Webb, Inc. had brought
an action for damages to their barricade, they could not prove
the negligence of Byrum by the judgment in the previous case
against both parties which dismissed the suit as to Ames and
Webb, Inc., but held Byrum negligent. Under these rules, the
Court held that a suit in which there were no cross-claims was
not conclusive as to the defendant company's negligence.
During the past year, two significant cases arose under the
Guest Statute.18 The Court held in Dickinson v. Miller14 that
mere monetary compensation is not the only consideration that
will change the occupaiht of an automobile from a guest to a pay-
ing passenger. Services rendered or to be rendered are sufflicient.
A bargain for service in return for the offered transportation is
sufficient to make a person a paying passenger. In the other case,"
the question was not whether the occupant was a passenger, but
whether the guest was guilty of contributory negligence and
whether the driver was grossly negligent towards his passenger.
The passenger, plaintiff, was held not contributorily negligent
as a matter of law for there was nothing to indicate that the
trust of the passenger in the driver's competence was misplaced.
This rule is derived from a series of cases of which the first was
Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Wellons Ad'mr.17
11 196 Va. s97, 85 S.E.2d 364 (1955).
12 192 Va. 32, 63 SE.2d 761 (1951).
Is Va. Code 18-646.1 (1950).
14 196 Va. 659, 85 S.E.2d 275 (1955).
Is White v. Gregory, 161 Va. 414, 170 SM. 739 (1933).
10 Newell v. Riggin, 197 Va. 496, 90S.E.2d 150 (1955).
17 155 Va. 218, 154 S.E. 575 (1930).
The fact that the plaintiff was asleep bore no causal connection
to the accident.
The fact that the driver fell asleep made out a prima facie
case of want of due care, but the passenger could recover only if
the injuries sustained were caused by the gross negligence of the
driver.18 Gross negligence as defined by the Court in Thornhill
v. Thornhill,19 and applied here is a manifestly smaller amount
of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances re-
quire of a person of ordinary prudence. It was held to be a
question of degree and not of kind. The question of whether
there was gross negligence or not is one of fact and is to be left
to the discretion of the jury unless it is so clear that reasonable
people could not differ and then it becomes one of law.
Burden of Proof. Failure to carry the burden of proof
denied recovery to several plaintiffs. A case of this type was
Olds v. Wood2 where the plaintiff was injured by a flash fire
while her hair was being shampooed. Plaintiff alleged that the
manufacturer of the preparation had failed to use due and proper
care in manufacture and to give due and proper instructions as
to its use. The defendant's evidence qhowed that when used ac-
cording to the directions a flash fire was not possible. The Court
ruled that the plaintiff failed in her burden of proof. There
being no affirmative proof of negligence, there could be no re-
covery. In Lane v. Hampton,21 the plaintiff in an action for
wrongful death, failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the injuries from which the decedent died were caused by
the negligence of the defendant. In the absence of any notice,
the driver of an automobile using a highway has the right to as-
sume that it is clear.22
In Fletcher v. Horn,2 where- the defendant made out a
prima facie case against himself by admitting that he crossed into
the wrong lane in violation of Section 46-220, the burden of proof
is upon him to offer a reasonable explanation. The explanation
must be such that it outweighs the positive evidence of the plain-
18 Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 SE. 77 (1931).
19 172 Va. 553, 2 SJE.2d 318 (1939).
20 196 Va. 960, 86 S.E.2d 32 (1955).
21 197 Va. 46, 87 S.E.2d 803 (1955).
22 Id. at 49, 87 S.E.2d at 805.
28 197 Va. 317, 89 S.E.2d 89 (1955).
tiff. Here, the explanation that he had crossed into the wrong
lane to avoid hitting the plaintiff's on-coming car, which was in
the wrong lane, was held by the Court to be sufficiently satis-
factory, in the absence of contradictory evidence that reason-
able people might not differ as to its effect. The plaintiff's fail-
ure to offer contradictory evidence constituted a failure to carry
his burden of proof.
Banks v. Liverman24 concerned the liability of a state em-
ployee for acts done in the course of his employment. The
action was brought in the Federal Court under admiralty juris-
diction, and the State was not sued because of its immunity.
This was an action for injuries received while working on a
State-operated ferry. The case was governed by Sayers v. Bul-
1ar 25 in that the evidence of the plaintiff failed to show any af-
firmative acts of negligence on the part of the defendant. With-
out this, the doctrine of Wynn v. Gaudy,2 6 holding that State
employees are liable for injuries which are the result of their
individual negligence in the performance of their duties within
the scope of their employment did not apply.
In two cases, Barb v. Lowe 2 7 and Short v. Long, s it was
held to be a jury question as to whether or not the plaintiff had
carried his burden of proof. In the former case where the validity
of lay estimates of distance was questioned, the Court, in rein-
stating a verdict for the defendant, held that estimates of dis-
tances by lay witnesses are at best approximations and whether
they are inherently incredible are questions for the jury. In the
latter case, where the evidence of neither party proved con-
clusively who was at fault, the Court held that since either version
could be supported, the jury's verdict settled the question of neg-
ligence. John E. Messick
24 129 F. Supp. 743 (195S).
25 180 Va. 222, 22 S.E.2d 9 (1942).
26 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938).
27 196 Va. 1014, 86 S.E.2d 854 (1955).
28197 Va. 104,87 S.E.2d 776 (1955).
